exceeds the constitutional requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. 11 The general exemption right at stake in Hobby Lobby is not constitutional but statutory-a congressional directive for religious accommodation that the Constitution generally permits, but does not require. One dimension of the many legal challenges to the Mandate is how RFRA's statutory strict scrutiny test should be understood and applied to claims for the exemption right it created. Hobby Lobby shed light on the answers to three important questions about this issue that emerged during the oral argument of Hobby Lobby and continue to shape discussions about RFRA and the Mandate:
1. When a court applies strict scrutiny under RFRA, must it find that a proposed alternative to religiously burdensome government action is financially, politically, or otherwise viable for it to qualify as an "available" less restrictive means of accomplishing the government's goals?
2. Is the "strict" scrutiny required by RFRA the deferential test of preSmith free exercise doctrine or the much more stringent standard of review used in free speech, due process, and equal protection cases?
3. Does the obligation to avoid burdening those who don't believe or adhere to an exempted religious practice constitute a justification for denying RFRA exemptions that satisfies strict scrutiny?
These three questions were each placed in sharp relief by positions articulated by Hobby Lobby's counsel at oral argument. This Article accordingly unfolds in three parts, each of which states, in ironic form, a basic proposition argued by Hobby Lobby's counsel, 12 and then examines what the opinions in Hobby Lobby supplied in the way of responses.
Part I shows that the government's proof that it used the "least restrictive means" may now be refuted by the mere suggestion of a "less restrictive alternative," even if Congress is unlikely to enact that alternative or the alternative is otherwise impractical. Part II shows that the majority has rejected the evenhanded balancing of the pre-Smith free exercise cases in favor of a robust and genuinely strict scrutiny that is far more difficult for the government to satisfy, and sketches the threatening implications of this move for the Mandate and other important laws governing the workplace. Finally, Part III notes the inconsistency of the majority's apparent need to save Hobby Lobby from incurring additional expense to practice its religion, at the same time that it refused to recognize the injustice of imposing the expenses of practicing Hobby Lobby's religion on its employees. Part III also discusses the importance of the recognition by five Justices that the legal obligation to avoid burdening employees who do not benefit from 2015]
One Cheer for Hobby Lobby 157 Hobby Lobby's RFRA exemption is a sufficient justification for refusing exemptions, even under strict scrutiny. Hobby Lobby's determination that RFRA requires genuinely strict scrutiny that is not satisfied if a less restrictive (though wholly impractical) alternative can be imagined basically creates a right to religious exemption for anyone who asks for one. Therefore, I conclude that the recognition by five Justices of the importance of avoiding the imposition of burdens on thirdparty employees is a critical part of RFRA strict scrutiny. By recognizing that courts may not order RFRA exemptions that impose significant burdens on third parties who do not believe or practice the exempted religion, these Justices defined a necessary constraint on the unlimited exemption right Hobby Lobby would have otherwise created.
I. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PAY FOR THE CONTRACEPTIVES HOBBY LOBBY WON'T PAY FOR (THOUGH ITS POLITICAL ALLIES WILL WALK BAREFOOT OVER BROKEN GLASS TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING).
Since the Nixon administration, Title X of the Public Health Service Act has provided funding for a limited amount of contraceptives to lowerincome women at little or no cost, through family planning organizations like Planned Parenthood. 13 At oral argument, Hobby Lobby's counsel invoked government funding generally and Title X in particular as less restrictive alternatives to the Mandate, insisting that Hobby Lobby employees could get the contraceptives Hobby Lobby refuses to cover from existing Title X organizations or a new government program.
14
The Hobby Lobby majority essentially adopted counsel's argument. Though it did not mention Title X specifically, it suggested in dicta that RFRA requires the government to pursue direct distribution or funding of disputed contraceptives as a less restrictive alternative to imposition of the Mandate on objecting employers. 15 In the majority's view, the Mandate failed strict scrutiny under RFRA even though it was assumed to further compelling government interests in promoting women's health and reducing gender disparities in healthcare costs, because direct government supply of the contraceptives would afford the same access to contraceptives as the 13 U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TITLE X FAMILY PLANNING, archived at http://perma.cc/77YA-X8MP.
14 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356) ("I don't think there's anything sort of sacrosanct, if you will, about having the government pay for its preferred subsidy as a less restrictive alternative."); id. at 84 ("The government paying or a third-party insurer paying is a perfectly good least restrictive alternative."); id. at 86 (" [T] here's also Title X, which provides for contraception coverage, which is another least restrictive alternative . . . . [T]he most obvious least restrictive alternative is for the government to pay for their favorite contraception methods themselves."). 15 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2800-02.
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Mandate without infringing on Hobby Lobby's religious anti-contraception beliefs.
16
The majority went beyond dicta to hold that extension of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit employers who religiously object to the Mandate is a less restrictive alternative to imposing the Mandate on such employers. 17 This accommodation excuses from the Mandate those religious nonprofit employers not already categorically exempted as churches or religious congregations, such as religiously affiliated hospitals, universities, and social service organizations. 18 The accommodation requires the employer to complete and sign a government form that lists the religiously objectionable contraceptives that its health plan will not cover, and then to send the form to its third-party health insurer or, if self-insured, to its plan administrator. 19 The employer's health plan is then relieved of the obligation to cover the contraceptives to which it objects, which are instead supplied by the insurer or plan administrator at no additional cost to employees, dependents, or the objecting employer.
20
A critical premise of the majority opinion, therefore, is that all female employees and dependents of Hobby Lobby would in fact receive the mandated contraception coverage if the government were to pursue either direct government funding of contraceptives to which employers object, or extension of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit businesses. 21 In either event, the majority flatly declared, "[t]he effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby 16 Id. In accordance with the Court's suggestion, the government recently initiated a rulemaking procedure designed to extend the religious nonprofit exemption to closely held for-profit corporations that object to the Mandate. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,118 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). Self-insured employers fund their own insurance plans, but rarely pay claims or otherwise administer the plans themselves, contracting instead with the thirdparty insurance company to act as the "plan administrator" for the employer. 21 The Court reasoned that extension of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit businesses does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious belief that providing insurance coverage violates their religion, and it serves HHS's stated interests equally well. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2782-83 ("The principal dissent identifies no reason why this accommodation would fail to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the contraception mandate, and there is none. Under the accommodation, the plaintiffs' female employees would continue to receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives, and they would continue to 'face minimal logistical and administrative obstacles,' because their employers' insurers would be responsible for providing information and coverage.") (quoting id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); accord Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807 ("Nothing in this interim order affects the ability of the applicant's employees and students to obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives.").
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Lobby . . . would be precisely zero," since "these women would still be entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost-sharing." 22 But expansion of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held corporations and direct government funding of contraceptives for employees and dependents of such corporations may not be feasible without a substantial increase in government spending. Title X, for example, does not cover all forms of contraception, the supply of contraceptives its limited funding permits is similarly limited, and it serves only lower-income women. 23 If the healthcare plans of Hobby Lobby and other closely held for-profit businesses are to be exempted from the Mandate on the theory that their employees and covered dependents could obtain disputed contraceptives from organizations receiving Title X grants, it is doubtful that such organizations could pick up the slack without a significant increase in Title X funding and an expansion of eligibility requirements.
Extension of the nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit businesses may also be financially implausible without a significant increase in funding. Supplying contraceptives is thought to be cost-neutral to thirdparty insurers who sell health plans paid for with employer premiums, because the costs such insurers incur in providing free contraceptives are almost certainly equal to or less than the prenatal and childbirth expenses they avoid by facilitating the increased use of contraception.
24 This is not the case, however, for plan administrators who operate health plans for selfinsured employers; in that case the benefit of childbirth expenses avoided by contraceptives accrues to the employer who funds the plan rather than the administrator who runs it. Administrators will thus incur additional operating costs from providing contraceptives in the place of objecting employers, which will not be offset by the realization of savings elsewhere. 25 The Mandate originally allowed administrators of self-insured plans funded by objecting religious nonprofit employers to claim a tax credit equal to the additional costs they will incur from providing no-cost contraception to the employees and dependents of such employers. 26 At the time this religious nonprofit accommodation was finalized, it was unlikely to require sig- Hobby Lobby upended this expectation. Closely held for-profit businesses constitute about 90% of all employers in the United States, 29 and employ between one-half and four-fifths of all employees. 30 Thus, extending the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit businesses, as the administration proposed in the wake of Hobby Lobby, 31 expands the universe of potential religious claimants and affected employees from a very small to a quite large percentage of all employers and employees. In light of this dramatic expansion of potential RFRA claimants and negatively affected employees, it can no longer be assumed that the required funding will be 27 See, e.g., U. 
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32
Funding for direct government coverage of contraceptives or a substantially larger exchange-tax credit is not politically viable, and it is disingenuous to suggest otherwise. Religious and political conservatives have been trying to defund federal contraception-coverage programs since the Reagan administration, 33 with considerable success: Title X funding, for example, has been cut nearly in half in real terms since inception of the program in 1974. 34 Many of the same persons and groups are also actively committed to defunding the entire ACA 35 36 Amici filing briefs in support of Hobby Lobby were overwhelmingly composed of Republican members of Congress who are publicly committed to repealing or defunding the ACA (e.g., Senators Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.), Orrin Hatch (RUtah), Mike Lee (R-Utah), Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), and David Vitter (R-La.)); Roman Catholic, evangelical Protestant, and other religiously conservative clerics, leaders, scholars, and organizations (e.g., Prof. Gerard V. Bradley, the Family Research Council, Prof. Richard Garnett, Dr. Robert George, the National Association of Evangelicals, Dr. Daniel Philpott, the Southern Baptist Seminary, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and Dr. Christopher Wolfe); and politically conservative think tanks and public interest firms (e.g., the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and the Rutherford Institute). See Burwell v. [Vol. 38 to increase funding for Title X or to fund any other government program designed to supply free contraceptives to female employees and dependents of for-profit employers exempted from the Mandate. Unsurprisingly, the aftermath of Hobby Lobby has seen no letup in conservative efforts to defund Title X and the ACA, and to block or reduce direct government supply of contraceptives. 37 No conservative persons or organizations have stepped up to endorse an increase in Title X or other government funding to fill the potential contraception coverage gap created by opening the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held secular for-profits, and religious conservatives continue to attack the nonprofit accommodation itself. 38 If direct government coverage or extension of the existing religious nonprofit accommodation requires additional funding that is unlikely to be approved, then it is questionable that either of these alternatives is truly available. 39 The political realities blocking government funding of contraception serve as stark reminders that whatever lawyers or judges might conjure up as hypothetical alternatives, in the real world where women actually live, an increase in Title X funding or the creation of any other such program to fill the gap caused by RFRA exemptions is politically dead on arrival in Congress. RFRA exemptions for religiously objecting employers therefore threaten to force female employees and the covered female dependents of all employees to pay out of pocket for something that the government has compelling interests in making available through employer health plans at no additional cost. The "alternative" to the Mandate proposed by the Hobby Lobby majority exists only in the imaginations of the Justices who suggested it, 40 and risks leaving the government unable to advance its admittedly com- 
pelling goals of protecting women's health and reducing gender disparities in healthcare costs whenever government funding is required. It takes more than a little chutzpah, then, for Hobby Lobby and other religious conservative businesses-not to mention the Hobby Lobby majority itself-to suggest either direct government funding or expansion of the religious nonprofit accommodation as less restrictive alternatives to application of the Mandate to for-profit corporations, when their religious and political allies have been doing everything possible to kill Title X and the entire ACA, and to expand the religious nonprofit accommodation. If their position is that female Hobby Lobby employees and dependents must depend on direct government funding to receive the benefits of the Mandate, then they should have the honesty to admit that those women are not going to receive those benefits because Congress will almost certainly not appropriate the money to fund them-that the costs to women employees will not be "precisely zero," because it is thought more important to protect the religious "conscience" of a multi-billion dollar corporation than the government's compelling interests in women's health and gender equity.
II. THE GOVERNMENT CAN'T POSSIBLY SATISFY STRICT SCRUTINY HERE (BUT IT EASILY CAN EVERYWHERE ELSE).
As I have indicated, RFRA provides that believers are to be excused from the obligation to obey religiously burdensome federal laws, unless the government satisfies strict scrutiny by proving that the burden is the "least restrictive means" of furthering a "compelling government interest."
41 At oral argument, Hobby Lobby's counsel maintained that the Mandate cannot possibly satisfy strict scrutiny, yet he also dismissed suggestions that exempting Hobby Lobby from the Mandate would open the floodgates to RFRA exemptions from other important government laws. One just needs to "trust the courts" to make reasonable balances, he urged. 42 The Court did not need to worry about exemptions from child vaccination requirements, minimum wage laws, payment of social security and other taxes, or myriad other laws regulating public health, the for-profit workplace, or access to benefits-all of these, counsel implied, are necessary to the advancement of firms object on religious grounds, so this alternative may be theoretically adequate but politically impossible."); see also compelling government goals and thus would never be subjected to exemptions like the one sought by Hobby Lobby. 43 But, if RFRA's strict scrutiny test was so hard to satisfy in the case of the Mandate, why should it be so easy to satisfy in every other case the Justices could imagine? Or, more to the point, if vaccinations, minimum wages, and social security pensions are so obviously the least restrictive means of advancing compelling government interests in protecting public health, avoiding worker exploitation, and ensuring subsistence incomes for the elderly, as counsel insisted, why wasn't the Mandate the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling goals of promoting women's health and workplace equality and reducing gender disparities in the cost of health care?
The Mandate would almost certainly have passed muster under the preSmith exemption doctrine that RFRA purported to restore. Whatever its formal expression, the scrutiny given to religiously burdensome government actions prior to Smith was exceedingly deferential. 44 Beginning with the birth of the free exercise exemption regime in 1963 45 and running to its general demise in 1990, 46 the Court considered at least fourteen exemption claims under the Free Exercise Clause, but granted only five (four of which involved denial of unemployment compensation benefits). 47 One study has 43 See, e.g., id. at 5 ("I do think in the context of vaccinations, the government may have a stronger compelling interest than it does in this context because there are notions of herd immunity and the like that give the government a particularly compelling interest in trying to maximize the number . . . [cut off]."); id. at 14 ("[T]he parade of horribles that the government offers you ought to sound familiar, because if you look at that parade of horribles-Social Security, minimum wage, discrimination laws, compelled vaccination-every item on that list was included in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Smith."); id. at 21 ("[United States v. Lee] does stand for the proposition that in the tax context, it's going to be very hard for somebody to bring a claim that satisfies even the demanding compelling interest, least restrictive alternative test."); id. at 85 ("I think Lee says that taxes are different and not all exemptions are created equal, because some exemptions undermine the compelling interest."). 44 50 Whether rooted in a religious exemption statute or the Free Exercise Clause itself, the judicial scrutiny applied to religious exemption claims was "strict in theory but feeble in fact." 51 Until now. Hobby Lobby left little doubt that RFRA now imposes a genuinely "strict" standard of review entailing serious and searching scrutiny of religiously burdensome government actions. RFRA's "least restrictive means" standard, the majority declared, is a "stringent" and "exceptionally demanding" test, 52 which could hardly describe its pre-Smith 53 It went on to hold that the religious nonprofit accommodation is a less restrictive alternative that can be extended to closely held for-profit businesses like Hobby Lobby, supposedly ensuring the mandated contraception coverage to female employees and covered dependents while accommodating Hobby Lobby's religious objections.
54
When it struck down RFRA as it applied to the states, the Court called strict scrutiny under RFRA "the most demanding test known to constitutional law." 55 This suggested that RFRA strict scrutiny is now as demanding as the strict scrutiny applied under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Speech Clauses, which the government usually cannot satisfy. 56 At any rate, the RFRA strict scrutiny deployed in Hobby Lobby is clearly not the deferential version of strict scrutiny that inhabits the pre-Smith free exercise cases. 53 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (maintaining that a less restrictive means of accomplishing the Mandate's goals "would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health insurance policies due to their employers' religious objections"); see also id. at 2781-82 (reading RFRA as requiring the government "to expend additional funds to accommodate citizens' religious beliefs" in certain cases, and rejecting the government's argument that it cannot be required to make relatively small expenditures to eliminate religious burdens caused by the pursuit of government goals). As I argued in Part I, there is a serious question about whether this alternative is really "available." 54 Id. at 2763. It is anticipated that the religious nonprofit accommodation will be cost-neutral for insurers but not for administrators. The Mandate thus contains a tax credit and other means for insurers (if they in fact incur costs) and administrators to recoup any costs without directly or indirectly charging the exempted religious nonprofits. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 25, at 350-52. See also supra text accompanying notes 25-26. 55 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524. City of Boerne also mistakenly declared that RFRA's "less restrictive means" test was not present in the pre-Smith accommodation jurisprudence, and thus erred in stating that RFRA constituted a doctrinal addition to, rather than a restoration of that jurisprudence. Id. at 535. This was demonstrably wrong at the time the Court declared it. In dismissing the state's argument that denial of unemployment insurance to Sabbath observers was necessary to avoid fraudulent claims and employee-scheduling difficulties, Sherbert v. Verner expressly assumed that less restrictive means analysis was a necessary part of the free exercise exemption balance. See 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) ("[E]ven if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the [unemployment insurance] fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the [state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."). United States v. Lee subsequently employed less restrictive means analysis to deny the exemption claim in that case. See 455 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1982) (concluding that claimant's payment of Social Security taxes on his employees was necessary to the funding of Social Security benefits, notwithstanding the burden this placed on his religious beliefs). The Hobby Lobby majority unfortunately replicated City of Boerne's error. See 134 S. Ct. at 2767 n.18 (reaffirming City of Boerne's declaration that RFRA went beyond pre-Smith jurisprudence "by imposing a least-restrictive-means test"). 56 Winkler, supra note 50, at 815 (reporting that government satisfied strict scrutiny in 33% of freedom of association cases, 27% of suspect-class discrimination cases, 24% of fundamental rights cases, and 22% of freedom of speech cases).
There is, therefore, no reason to credit the assurances of Hobby Lobby's counsel-or, for that matter, those of the Hobby Lobby majority-that the government will be able to satisfy strict scrutiny in most cases involving important government laws or benefits.
57 Simply "trusting the courts" to make reasonable balances, as counsel suggested, 58 was an option only under the pre-Smith deferential form of "strict" scrutiny. After Hobby Lobby, scrutiny is now truly "strict": the government is required to prove that important federal laws providing critical benefits and protections in the workplace must satisfy a rigorous constitutional test whenever they are applied to objecting believers. It is easy to imagine employer claims to an exemption from covering all contraceptives in a healthcare plan (not just a few) and other prescriptions and procedures (not just contraceptives); RFRA might even be used to justify employer exemption from prohibitions on gender, religion, or sexual orientation discrimination-prohibitions the majority studiously ignored in emphasizing the purportedly limited reach of its holding.
59
Hobby Lobby's muscular interpretation of RFRA strict scrutiny is more than a little ironic given that Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act precisely to restore the abandoned, deferential pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, as the statute originally and expressly provided, 60 and as its congressional proponents were at pains to assure RFRA skeptics. 61 But 57 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (declaring that the government could satisfy strict scrutiny in response to exemption claims from immunization requirements and racial anti-discrimination laws). 58 See supra note 42. 59 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 38 (suggesting that after Hobby Lobby small businesses might obtain RFRA exemptions from providing services at same-sex weddings "when many alternative providers are at hand"); cf. Molly Ball, Hobby Lobby is Already Creating New Religious Demands on Obama, ATLANTIC, July 2, 2014, archived at http:// perma.cc/GR3T-BPRS (reporting on faith leaders who urged that Hobby Lobby requires or permits expansion of religious exemptions from proposed executive order banning LGBT discrimination by federal contractors). But see Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Hobby Lobby in the Long Run, CORNERSTONE BLOG (July 1, 2014), http://berkleycenter.george town.edu/cornerstone/hobby-lobby-the-ruling-and-its-implications-for-religious-freedom/ responses/hobby-lobby-in-the-long-run, archived at http://perma.cc/5CSL-GKR9 (suggesting that exemption claims in other areas are unlikely to succeed: "Although it is true that for-profit firms can now bring RFRA claims, most claims by for-profit employers to escape their legal obligations will not fare so well. For example, the government has very strong interests in combating employment discrimination, and the government has no obvious alternative means to accommodate the interests of employees in not being the victims of discrimination.").
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994) (defining "exercise of religion" in terms of the Court's prior free exercise decisions); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (finding that "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests"). 61 See The ACA regulations do not actually create a legal requirement that employer health plans cover FDA-approved contraceptives and related services. The regulations provide only that if an employer offers a health plan to its employees, that plan must cover contraceptives. 64 Employers with more than fifty employees who fail to offer a health plan must pay an annual tax of $2,000 per employee, and their employees are then eligible to purchase health insurance directly on the federal or relevant state ACA exchange, with qualifying subsidies.
65
Two thousand dollars per employee is far less than any employer's annual cost of providing health insurance to its employees and their covered dependents. 66 Hobby Lobby, therefore, could have avoided providing the contraceptives to which it objects by eliminating its health insurance plan and paying the "no-plan tax" for each of its roughly 23,000 employees,
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One Cheer for Hobby Lobby 169 who instead would have purchased subsidized health insurance on the health insurance exchanges. Forty-six million dollars is surely a lot of money, but it is dwarfed by the expenses Hobby Lobby currently incurs to maintain a health insurance plan for all of its employees and their many dependents.
68
At oral argument, however, Hobby Lobby's counsel complained bitterly at the unfairness of suggestions by Justices Kagan, Kennedy, and Sotomayor that Hobby Lobby could both honor its religious beliefs and comply with the Mandate by eliminating its health insurance plan and paying the no-plan tax: Hobby Lobby would not only have to pay the tax, counsel protested, it would also have to increase wages to attract employees in the absence of a health insurance benefit. 69 This would increase its costs of doing business and that, he urged, would constitute an unacceptable burden on its religious exercise under RFRA. 70 He had literally nothing to say, however, about the unfairness of shifting that burden to Hobby Lobby's employees. , and approximately $271.1 million for average family coverage of all employees (23,000 employees x $11,786). Of course, the actual expense would vary, depending upon whether benefits covered by its plan are below or above the average coverage, as well as upon the mix of employees electing single, family, and no coverage. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the total cost of Hobby Lobby's health plan expenses substantially exceeds the $46 million "no-plan" tax it would pay if it did not offer a health plan.
Indeed, the numbers are so compelling that Standard & Poor's estimates that in less than a decade 90% of large-employee companies like Hobby Lobby will find it financially and administratively advantageous to follow precisely this course, terminating their group health plans, paying the no-plan tax, and sending their employees to the exchanges to purchase individual and family health insurance policies with subsidies. Michael G. Thompson [s] away the health care insurance, they are going to have to increase wages to make up for that. And they're going to have to pay the $2,000 penalty on top of it . . . ."); accord id. at 29 ("What I'm pointing out, though, is for purposes of the substantial burden analysis, it is perfectly appropriate to take into account the 2,000-the $26 million in fines they would pay [based on 13,000 employees] would not be the only thing that they would lose out if they are on that horn of the dilemma. They would also lose out all the additional wages they would have to pay . . . .").
Counsel also argued that Hobby Lobby's religious beliefs required it to provide employee health insurance coverage, see id. at 27-29, but this seems unlikely. While an employer might plausibly claim a religious obligation to ensure that its employees have adequate health insurance, it seems implausible that any employer could sincerely assert a religious requirement that it and no one else provide that insurance, as Justices Ginsburg and Kagan suggested. See id. at 28-29. In any event, the majority accepted this claim without any attention to or discussion of its precise content, let alone the sincerity with which it was made. It is well documented that failure to cover approved contraceptives in an employer health plan imposes significant out-of-pocket costs on employees, who then have to pay for the excluded contraceptives with after-tax wages instead of having them fully covered by insurance that they pay for only in part and with pre-tax wages. 71 Such expenses can be substantial. For example, the $1,000 upfront cost of an intrauterine device-the most effective form of contraception and one to which Hobby Lobby objects-is a serious financial obstacle to lower-income employees. 72 So according to counsel, RFRA should be read to protect a multi-billion dollar corporation against a marginal increase in its operating expenses as the cost of observing its religious beliefs against IUDs and other emergency contraception, 73 but not to prevent the same corporation from shifting the costs of that observance onto lower-income employees and dependents who believe and practice differently. How much credence, really, does such a callous claim deserve?
Quite a bit, it turns out-the majority accepted it. Though the government did not raise or rely on the argument that Hobby Lobby could have avoided the religious burden of the Mandate by terminating its health plan, 74 the majority reached out to criticize the substantive merits of this argument, albeit in dicta. 75 The majority flatly rejected the possibility that terminating its plan and paying the no-plan tax eliminated any substantial burden on Hobby Lobby's anti-contraception beliefs, 76 agreeing with counsel that implementing this choice might increase Hobby Lobby's net employee compensation expenses: "[I]t is far from clear that the net cost to the companies of providing insurance is more than the cost of dropping their insurance plans and paying the ACA penalty . . . [and] that it would be financially advantageous for an employer to drop coverage and pay the penalty." 77 The majority, in other words, apparently believed that RFRA protects Hobby Lobby from any increase in its operating costs as compared to the status quo ante predating the Mandate, unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny.
Because the majority assumed that expanding the religious nonprofit accommodation would still provide employees of exempted employers with the mandated contraceptives at no cost, it saved itself from the awkward task of explaining why Hobby Lobby's employees should bear costs generated by Hobby Lobby's anti-contraception beliefs when Hobby Lobby is neither willing nor (apparently) obligated to bear any of them itself. Instead, the majority's silence suggested that Hobby Lobby employees would not be burdened even if they never receive the mandated contraceptives at no cost. Though it conceded, as it must, that balances under RLUIPA (and thus also RFRA) must "take account" of burdens on third parties, 78 it nevertheless maintained that no such burdens exist when third parties are merely deprived of a benefit which government has directed the religious claimant to supply to another private party. 79 Otherwise, the majority warned, the government could require Muslim-owned supermarkets to sell alcohol (for the convenience of customers), or require orthodox Jewish-owned restaurants to remain open on Saturday (to allow their nonorthodox waiters to earn tips), 80 though the majority neglected to explain how indulging individual preferences about where to purchase alcohol or when to earn tips could possibly constitute a "compelling" government interest even in the bizarre world the majority conjured up.
The majority's sophistry reads third-party burden analysis completely out of RFRA, RLUIPA, and the Constitution itself. Virtually every law and regulation in the for-profit workplace directs one private party (usually the employer) to provide a benefit to another (usually the employee). The Fair Labor Standards Act directs employers to provide employees the benefits of limited hours and minimum pay; 81 the Occupational Safety and Health Act directs employers to provide employees the benefit of a safe working environment; 82 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act directs employers to provide existing and prospective employees the benefits of an employment market and a work environment free of race, gender, religion, national origin, and disability discrimination; 83 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act directs employees to supply employees the benefits of safe and stable retirement and insurance compensation; 84 the list is almost endless. If it were possible to re-characterize third-party burdens as mere "unreceived benefits" 78 Id. at 2781 n.37 ("It is certainly true that in applying RFRA 'courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.'") (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)). 79 Id. at 2781 n.37 ("[I]t could not reasonably be maintained that any burden on religious exercise, no matter how onerous and no matter how readily the government interest could be achieved through alternative means, is permissible under RFRA so long as the relevant legal obligation requires the religious adherent to confer a benefit on third parties."). 80 Id. 
